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ABSTRACT: This article focuses on the balance between mutual recognition in criminal matters, mutu-
al trust and the protection of fundamental rights, in the light of the recent case-law of the Court of 
Justice. Mutual trust implies a presumption that the Member States adequately protect fundamental 
rights. However, this presumption is rebuttable. Mutual trust is not blind and mutual recognition is 
not automatic. Besides the grounds for refusal of a request for judicial cooperation codified in EU 
secondary law, the Court identifies a new general limit to mutual recognition and mutual trust. 
These principles are barred in exceptional situations, in the event a systemic flaw leads to a serious 
risk of a manifest violation of the Charter. The article contends that even individual serious in-
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fringements can amount to precluding the obligation to cooperate incumbent upon the Member 
States. This approach marks a twofold shift of paradigm. Firstly, it strengthens the European Union’s 
role as a fundamental rights promoter. Secondly, it empowers national authorities, that are entitled 
to verify whether other Member States properly respect their obligation to protect the rights en-
shrined in the Charter. Rather than focusing on theoretical containment of distrust, the EU 
strengthens mutual trust by the means of a more effective protection of fundamental rights. 
 
KEYWORDS: mutual recognition – mutual trust – European arrest warrant – fundamental rights – re-
fusal of execution – systemic deficiencies. 
 
I. Introduction 
When opposing interests underpinning general principles of EU law collide, the search 
for a balance between them reflects the overall state of the European Union.1 Whatever 
the outcome of the balance is, however, this crash has an impact and something has to 
be sacrificed.2 But then a post-collision era starts and the identification of the primary 
values and objectives of the European legal order leads to a new equilibrium. Until the 
next collision, at least.3 
All EU policies face the risk of a clash between principles,4 especially after the Lis-
bon Treaty’s coming into force and the conferral of primary legal authority to the Char-
ter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (Charter).5 However, some domains 
appear more exposed to the phenomenon, due to the close interconnection of princi-
 
1 In general, see T. PÉREZ, Conflicts of rights in the European Union. A theory of supranational adjudica-
tion, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. 
2 Nonetheless, many studies on the conflicts between general principles of EU law share a common 
denominator, namely the idea that collisions should be resolved ensuring the observance of their equal 
ranking in the EU legal order: V. TRSTENJAK, E. BEYSEN, The growing overlap between fundamental freedoms 
and fundamental rights in the case law of the CJEU, in European Law Review, 2013, p. 293 et seq. In case the 
conflict is solved by the EU legislator, the latter will be given considerable leeway to strike a fair balance, 
thereby confining the Court of Justice’s scrutiny of validity to the so called manifestly inappropriate bal-
ance test: G. ANAGNOSTARAS, Balancing conflicting fundamental rights: the Sky Österreich paradigm, in Europe-
an Law Review, 2014, p. 111 et seq. 
3 S. DE VRJIES, The protection of fundamental rights within Europe’s internal market after Lisbon. An en-
deavour for more harmony, in S. DE VRJIES, U. BERNITS, S. WEATHERHILL, The protection of fundamental rights in 
the EU after Lisbon, Oxford and Portland: Hart Publishing, 2013, p. 60. The Author uses the images of a 
clash of titans and of Plato’s praise for harmony in The Republic. 
4 Scholars have extensively analysed the overlap and the subsequent frequent need for a balance 
between fundamental freedoms and fundamental rights. See for instance, recently, S. REYNOLDS, Explain-
ing the constitutional drivers behind a perceived judicial preference for free movement over fundamental rights, 
in Common Market Law Review, 2016, p. 643 et seq. 
5 S. IGLÉSIAS SANCHEZ, The Court and the Charter: the impact of the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on 
the ECJ’s approach to fundamental rights, in Common Market Law Review, 2012, p. 1565 et seq.; A. ROSAS, H. 
KAILA, L’application de la Charte des droits fondamentaux de l’Union européenne par la Cour de Justice: un 
premier bilan, in Il diritto dell’Unione europea, 2011, p. 1 et seq. 
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ples and rights, which often guard opposing interests.6 From this point of view, police 
and judicial cooperation in criminal matters is a powerful magnetic pole,7 which has at-
tracted meteor swarms over its 15 year evolution.8 In particular, both EU secondary law 
and the case-law of the CJEU reveal continuous tension between the effectiveness of 
judicial cooperation mechanisms and the protection of the fundamental rights of the 
individuals concerned.9 In a series of preliminary rulings on the interpretation of the 
Framework Decision on the European arrest warrant (EAW),10 the Court tried to reduce 
tension in favour of the former and in light of the principles of mutual recognition and 
mutual trust between Member States.11 
However, the balance struck in Luxembourg has recently been put under pressure 
by further requests raised by national jurisdictions under Art. 267 TFEU, once again fo-
cused on the EAW.12 These preliminary references have urged the Court of Justice to 
acknowledge that mutual recognition is not absolute and that the protection of funda-
mental rights can amount to limiting the duty incumbent upon the requested authority 
to execute an EAW. Such case-law has important systemic and direct implications for 
the overall functioning of judicial cooperation mechanisms. However, the new post-
collision balance between fundamental rights protection and full effectiveness of EU law 
it strikes is far from clear.  
The article addresses the theoretical questions underpinning fundamental rights pro-
tection in EU judicial cooperation mechanisms and outlines the material impact of the 
Court’s legal reasoning. First, the analysis briefly focuses on the notions of mutual recog-
 
6 For what concerns judicial cooperation in criminal matters, see T.P. MARGUERY, The protection of fun-
damental rights in European criminal law after Lisbon: what role for the Charter of Fundamental Rights?, in 
European Law Review, 2013, p. 444 et seq. 
7 P. DE HERT, EU criminal law and fundamental rights, in V. MITSILEGAS, M. BERGSTRÖM, T. KONSTADINIDES 
(eds), Research Handbook on EU Criminal Law, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2016, p. 105, who 
underlines that “the penal instrument has both the power to protect and to compress fundamental rights”. 
8 See for instance E. GUILD, L. MARIN (eds), Still not resolved? Constitutional issues of European Arrest 
Warrant, Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers, 2009. 
9 Such tension has often been read from the point of view of the collision between security and fun-
damental rights: C. RIJKEN, Re-balancing security and justice: protection of fundamental rights in police and 
judicial cooperation in criminal matters, in Common Market Law Review, 2011, p. 1455 et seq.  
10 Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and 
the surrender procedures between Member States. 
11 See for instance Court of Justice, judgment of 1 December 2008, case C-388/08 PPU, Leymann and 
Pustovarov, para. 42; Court of Justice, judgment of 22 June 2012, case C-192/12 PPU, Melvin West, para. 56; 
Court of Justice, judgment of 30 May 2013, case C-168/13 PPU, Jeremy F., para. 35. L. MARIN, Effective and 
legitimate? Learning from the lesson of 10 years of practice with the European Arrest Warrant, in New Journal 
of European Criminal Law, 2014, p. 327 et seq. 
12 Following the expiry of the five years post-Lisbon transitional period, the strengthened jurisdiction 
of the Court of Justice under Art. 267 TFEU has led to an increasing number of preliminary references, 
often specific to certain Member States: Opinion of AG Cruz Villalón delivered on 6 July 2015, case C-
237/15 PPU, Lanigan, para. 1. 
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nition and mutual confidence, which the EU legislator and the CJEU have tried to describe 
as almost absolute principles. Paragraph three considers the limits imposed on these 
principles by EU secondary law, while paragraph four analyses the debate on the possibil-
ity of adding new grounds for refusal to the exhaustive list provided by the European leg-
islator. The developments of such debate are considered in the next part of the article, 
which focuses on the recent case-law of the CJEU concerning the balance between full ef-
fectiveness of judicial cooperation mechanisms and the protection of fundamental rights. 
In particular, close attention is given to the case-law concerning the grounds for non-
execution of European arrest warrants. The last paragraph considers the implications of 
the Court’s approach and outlines the possible future scenario for judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters, in light of the increased role of fundamental rights. 
II. Mutual recognition and mutual trust: unattainable stars in the 
sky? 
Since the end of the Nineties,13 the principle of mutual recognition has acquired in-
creasing importance and has ultimately become the “cornerstone of judicial coopera-
tion”.14 The TFEU acknowledges the key-role of this principle in both civil and criminal 
matters and leaves its specific regime to an ever expanding body of EU legislation.15 
Both secondary law and the case-law of the Court have converged to uphold the 
golden rule of mutual recognition, pursuant to which the national judicial authority ad-
dressees of a cooperation request are, in principle, under the twofold duty to both rec-
ognise and execute foreign decisions.16 The full effectiveness of judicial cooperation 
mechanisms requires execution to be generally automatic and dealt with as a matter of 
 
13 Tampere European Council Presidency Conclusions of 16 December 1999. 
14 See for instance the sixth recital of the Council Framework Decision 2002/584, cit. The principle 
has been described as a pillar and a technique for the construction of the European judicial area: K. 
NICOLAIDIS, Trusting the poles? Constructing Europe through mutual recognition?, in Journal of European Public 
Policy, 2007, p. 682 et seq.; N. PARISI, Tecniche di costruzione di uno spazio penale europeo. In tema di ricono-
scimento reciproco delle decisioni giudiziarie e di armonizzazione delle garanzie procedurali, in Studi 
sull’integrazione europea, 2012, p. 33 et seq. Nonetheless, the implementation of mutual recognition in-
struments at national level has proven to be to a large extent incomplete: G. VERNIMMEN, L. SURANO, A. 
WEYEMBERG (eds), The future of mutual recognition in criminal matters in the EU, Bruxelles: Editions de 
l’Université de Bruxelles, 2009. 
15 See respectively Arts 81 and 82 TFEU. On the idea of an evolving and ever expanding body of sec-
ondary law see V. MITSILEGAS, The third wave of third pillar law: which direction to EU criminal justice?, in Eu-
ropean Law Review, 2009, p. 523 et seq. This trend has been confirmed in the post-Lisbon era: C. 
AMALFITANO, Le prime direttive europee sul ravvicinamento “processuale”: il diritto all’interpretazione, alla tra-
duzione ed all’informazione nei procedimenti penali, in R. DEL COCO, E. PISTOIA (a cura di), Stranieri e giustizia 
penale. Problemi di perseguibilità e di garanzie nella normativa nazionale ed europea, Bari: Cacucci Editore, 
2014, p. 1 et seq. 
16 Court of Justice, judgment of 16 July 2015, case C-237/15 PPU, Lanigan, para. 36; Court of Justice, 
judgment of 5 April 2016, joined cases C-404/15 and C-659/15 PPU, Aranyosi and Căldăraru, para. 79. 
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urgency.17 In order to serve this purpose, a major role is assigned to the issuing authori-
ty, while the receiving one is usually prevented from any involvement in assessing the 
case.18 The latter cannot impose procedural formalities beyond those expressly permit-
ted by EU law and has to accept the result of the trial that took place in the foreign 
Member State, even if the application of its national procedural or substantive rules 
would have led to a different outcome.19 
The remarkable implications of mutual recognition also derive from mutual trust,20 
whose legal authority is a matter of extensive debate.21 In its first judgments on the ne 
bis in idem principle, the CJEU affirmed that “the Member States have mutual trust in 
their criminal justice systems”,22 but failed to attach a clear legal definition to this con-
cept, or provide it with a solid theoretical background. This is why AG Sharpston as-
sumed that mutual recognition and mutual confidence “are different names for the 
same principle”.23 Accordingly, part of the legal scholars pointed out that mutual confi-
dence merely inspires legislative action, but is not amenable to judicial review.24 AG Ja-
rabo Colomer, on the other hand, highlighted the autonomous meaning of this concept, 
which is closely intertwined with mutual recognition, although evokes the much higher 
level of the fundamental values shared by the Member States and is at the basis of the 
EU’s legal structure.25 More recently, building on the latter view, the Court started to re-
fer to mutual trust as a “principle” and eventually found its legal basis in Art. 2 TEU, 
which states the fundamental values the EU is based on and therefore implies and justi-
 
17 Art. 17 of Council Framework Decision 2002/584, cit. On the traditional importance of automaticity 
of cooperation mechanisms in the Area of freedom, security and justice and its gradual crisis, V. 
MITSILEGAS, The limits of mutual trust in Europe’s Area of freedom, security and justice: from automatic inter-
State cooperation to the slow emergence of the individual, in Yearbook of European Law, 2012, p. 319 et seq. 
18 C. JANSSENS, The principle of mutual recognition in EU law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, p. 
171 et seq. 
19 Court of Justice, judgment of 9 March 2006, case C-436/04, Van Esbroeck, para. 30. 
20 On the roots of this notion in judicial cooperation in criminal matters, D. FLORE, La notion de con-
fiance mutuelle: l’“alpha” ou l’“omega” d’une justice pénale européenne, in G. DE KERCHOVE, A. WEYEMBERGH 
(dir.), La confiance mutuelle dans l’espace penal européen, Bruxelles: Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles, 
2005. On the relationship between these two poles, B. NASCIMBENE, Le Traité de Lisbonne et l’espace judi-
ciaire européen: le principe de la confiance réciproque et reconnaissance mutuelle, in Revue des affaires euro-
péennes, 2011, p. 787 et seq. 
21 G. DE KERCHOVE, A. WEYEMBERGH (dir.), La confiance mutuelle, cit.; with regard to the relationship with 
the harmonisation of national substantive and procedural laws, C. AMALFITANO, Conflitti di giurisdizione e 
riconoscimento delle decisioni penali nell’Unione europea, Milano: Giuffré Editore, 2006, p. 180 et seq. 
22 Court of Justice, judgment of 11 February 2003, joined cases C-187/01 and C-385/01, Gözütok and 
Brügge, para. 33. 
23 Opinion of AG Sharpston delivered on 15 June 2006, case C-467/04, Gasparini, footnote 87. 
24 E. HERLIN-KARNELL, Constitutional principles in the EU Area of freedom, security and justice, in D. ACOSTA, 
C. MURPHY (eds), EU security and justice law, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2014, p. 36. 
25 Opinion of AG Jarabo Colomer delivered on 8 June 2006, case C-150/05, Van Straaten, para. 67. 
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fies mutual confidence between the Member States.26 As such, mutual trust does not 
only strengthen judicial cooperation,27 but also gives rise to judicially enforceable 
standards.28 
In this context, mutual recognition and mutual trust have emerged as the motors of 
European integration in criminal matters. Building on the ever closer integration be-
tween Member States, they are at first sight “attractive to Member States”,29 since they 
secure effectiveness and automaticity of judicial cooperation mechanisms without re-
sorting to further harmonisation of national criminal laws.30 
III. Set on a collision course: the limits of mutual recognition and 
mutual trust 
In the ambitious reading offered by secondary law and the case-law of the Court, mutu-
al recognition and mutual trust are very conspicuous in EU law. Now enshrined in the 
category of the general principles of EU legal order, they manifest a favor integrationis, 
urging an almost absolute precedence to the full effectiveness of judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters. However, judicial cooperation mechanisms are far from absolute: they 
directly affect individual rights and the fragmentation of national legal orders can also 
represent a stumbling block to their completion.31 Mutual recognition and mutual con-
 
26 Court of Justice, opinion 2/13 of 18 December 2014, para. 168.  
27 Mutual recognition and mutual trust have been developed in the context of the internal market, 
but they play a pivotal role in policy areas where the Member States resist further harmonisation: V. 
MITSILEGAS, The symbiotic relationship between mutual trust and fundamental rights in Europe’s area of crimi-
nal justice, in New Journal of European Criminal Law, 2015, p. 460 et seq. 
28 K. LENAERTS, The principle of mutual recognition in the Area of freedom, security and justice, in Il diritto 
dell’Unione europea, 2015, p. 525 et seq.  
29 V. MITSILEGAS, Mutual recognition, mutual trust and fundamental rights after Lisbon, in V. MITSILEGAS, M. 
BERGSTRÖM, T. KONSTADINIDES (eds), Research Handbook on European Criminal Law, cit., p. 149. 
30 They also create extra-territoriality, enabling a judicial decision to deploy its effects beyond na-
tional legal borders, within the borderless EU judicial area: K. NICOLAIDIS, Trusting the poles? Constructing 
Europe through mutual recognition, in Journal of European Public Policy, 2007, p. 682. 
31 For a critical appraisal, M. SPREEUW, Do as I say, not as I do. The application of mutual recognition and 
mutual trust, in Croatian Yearbook of European Law and Policy, 2012, p. 505 et seq. From a substantive point 
of view, it is common ground that the Council Framework Decision on the EAW tries to overcome these 
blocks by abolishing the double criminality requirement for certain serious crimes numbered in Art. 2, 
para. 2. The EU legislature followed a similar approach in the other Framework Decisions and Directives 
adopted in this domain. The fragmentation of national procedural laws has led in many cases the EU leg-
islator to allow the executing authority to adjust the request for judicial cooperation to the specific fea-
tures of its legal order. See for instance Art. 8, para. 1, of Council Framework Decision 2005/214/JHA of 24 
February 2005 on the application of the principle of mutual recognition to financial penalties, in light of 
which “the executing State may decide to reduce the amount of the penalty enforced to the maximum 
amount provided for acts of the same kind under the national law”, if the acts under consideration fall 
under its jurisdiction. 
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fidence are consequently set on a collision course with other general principles, funda-
mental rights above all.32 
The EU legislator and the Court have tried to prevent collisions, or at least limit their 
effects. With regard to the EAW, the CJEU has repeatedly underlined that the procedure 
of surrender represents a complete departure from the multilateral system of extradi-
tion, where the decision to provide judicial assistance is often based on the principle of 
opportuneness and exceeds the purely legal sphere.33 In order to facilitate and acceler-
ate judicial cooperation, therefore, the EU has comprehensively regulated the subject, 
identifying the grounds for refusal of cooperation that national authorities are allowed 
to invoke.34  
This leads to a major consequence: execution can be refused or conditioned only in 
light of the provisions of the relevant Framework Decisions or Directives, which provide 
an exhaustive list of specific grounds for refusal. Such limits to cooperation mechanisms 
are usually optional,35 with the sole exception of the Framework Decision 2002/584 that 
also provides for compulsory grounds.36 Conversely, national authorities are not enti-
tled to reject a cooperation request on the basis of new or additional reasons, since 
they would hamper judicial cooperation and foster mutual distrust. 
The predetermination ope legis of the grounds for refusal has raised extensive debate 
among practitioners and scholars.37 Despite ensuring the effectiveness of the surrender 
procedure, it deprives the system of flexibility and in principle does not allow national ju-
dicial authorities to take into due consideration different expectations of protection.38 
 
32 L. MARIN, The European arrest warrant and domestic legal orders. Tensions between mutual recognition 
and fundamental rights: the Italian case, in Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, 2008, p. 
473. On the more recent debated questions: V. MITSILEGAS, Mutual recognition, mutual trust and fundamen-
tal rights after Lisbon, in V. MITSILEGAS, M. BERGSTRÖM, T. KONSTADINIDES (eds), Research Handbook on European 
Criminal Law, cit., p. 148 et seq. 
33 See, for instance, Court of Justice, judgment of 17 July 2008, case C-66/08, Kozlowski, para. 31. 
34 Court of Justice, judgment of 26 February 2013, case C-399/11, Melloni, para. 44. On the rationale 
and scope of application of the various grounds for refusal usually listed in EU secondary law concerning 
judicial cooperation in criminal matters see A. SUOMINEN, The principle of mutual recognition in cooperation 
in criminal matters. A study of the principle in four Framework Decisions and in the implementation legislation 
in the Nordic Member States, Cambridge: Intersentia, 2011, p. 281 et seq. 
35 The Court clarified that the optional nature of these clauses does refer to the implementation of 
EU law and therefore does not allow national legislators to decide whether to transpose them or not. In-
stead, it is for the executing judicial authority to decide on their application, on the basis of an individual 
assessment. See for instance Court of Justice, judgment of 21 October 2010, case C-306/09, B., para. 52. 
36 Art. 3, of Council Framework Decision 2002/584, cit. 
37 In general, see M. MÖSTL, Preconditions and limits of mutual recognition, in Common Market Law Re-
view, 2010, p. 405; S. MONTALDO, I limiti della cooperazione in materia penale nell’Unione europea, Napoli: 
Editoriale Scientifica, 2015, pp. 334-429. 
38 Scholars have highlighted a shift of approach, from an overreliance on the vague concept of mu-
tual trust to the increasing role of the effectiveness paradigm: E. HERLIN-KARNELL, From mutual trust to full 
effectiveness of EU law: the years of the European arrest warrant, in European Law Review, 2013, p. 79 et seq. 
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In this way, on the one hand, the absence of a de minimis threshold has led to seri-
ous concerns about respecting the principle of proportionality. In fact, national authori-
ties have sometimes issued EAWs in relation to petty offences, such as the case of some 
stolen cauliflowers.39 This use of a complex, time-consuming and costly procedure has 
been harshly criticised,40 also in light of its consequences on the requested person.41 
However, it is formally correct, since no provisions of the Framework Decision impose a 
proportionality assessment by either the issuing or executing authorities.  
In response to this trend, given the failure of the attempts to amend the existing 
rules and the signals sent by national legislators and courts,42 the Commission urged a 
de facto preliminary scrutiny by the issuing authorities and the Council accordingly mod-
ified the EAW Handbook.43 Consequently, infringement of the principle of proportionali-
ty is not grounds for refusing surrender, but represents an indirect limit to judicial co-
operation all the same. It is a precondition that has to be fulfilled and that the issuing 
authority has to verify on the basis of the seriousness of the offence and the conse-
quences it causes.44 
The new trend was codified by Directive 2014/41/EU on the European Investigation 
Order (EIO). Art. 6, para. 1, let. a), that binds the issuing authority to issue an EIO only in 
 
39 See for instance the Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council 
COM(2011) 175 final of 11 April 2011 on the implementation since 2007 of the Framework Decision of 13 
June 2002 on the European Arrest Warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States. 
40 K. SUGMAN, P. GORKIC, Abuse of the European arrest warrant system, in N. KEJIZER, E. VAN SLIEDREGT (eds), 
The European arrest warrant in practice, Amsterdam: Springer, 2009, p. 245. See also L. MARIN, Effectiveness 
at any price? The European arrest warrant 10 years after, in New Journal of European Criminal Law, 2014, p. 
326, who defines this trend as a trivialisation of the system.  
41 Albeit falling under the scope of application of the EAW Framework Decision, certain offences are 
not serious enough to justify the requested person’s preventive detention for the purposes of surrender: 
D. HELENIUS, Mutual recognition in criminal matters and the principle of proportionality: effective proportionali-
ty or proportionate effectiveness?, in New Journal of European Criminal Law, 2014, p. 359. 
42 The Art. 21, para. 2, of the United Kingdom Extradition Act of 2003, lists proportionality among the 
grounds for refusal, on the basis of three elements: the seriousness of the conduct, the likely penalty that 
would be imposed and the possibility for the foreign authority to take less coercive measures. Such ap-
proach is not shared by the UK Supreme Court, judgment of 30 May 2012, Assange v. The Swedish Prosecu-
tion Authority. As to other national courts, see for instance Italian Court of Cassation, judgment of 22 May 
2013, no. 21988, refusing surrender with regard to the theft of some chickens. 
43 Council Conclusions of 28 May 2010 on follow-up to the recommendations in the final Report on the 
fourth round of mutual evaluations concerning the European arrest warrant and surrender procedures 
among the Member States of the EU. For critical remarks: L. MARIN, Effectiveness at any price?, cit., p. 327. 
44 The proportionality assessment by the issuing authority applies de facto in national legal orders. 
However, it has been also included in certain national laws implementing the Framework Decision 
2002/584. Art. 607, let. b), of the Polish code of criminal procedure, for instance, prevents national au-
thorities from issuing an EAW if it is not required in the interest of the administration of justice.  
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the event it is necessary and proportionate for the purposes of the proceedings at stake 
and taking into account the rights of the suspected or accused person.45  
On the other hand, similar arguments have been raised with regard to limiting the 
golden rule “recognise and execute” in light of the protection of fundamental rights, 
which is not included among the grounds for refusal either. This further critical aspect 
has been recently dealt with also by the CJEU and will be analysed in the following para-
graphs. 
IV. Meteor approaching! Fundamental rights and the European 
arrest warrant 
Framework Decision 2002/584 makes some general references to the obligation to pro-
tect fundamental rights. The twelfth recital states that the act under consideration re-
spects the rights recognised by Art. 6 TEU, and reflected by the Charter.46 Consequently, 
in light of Art. 1, para. 3, the Framework Decision “shall not have the effect of modifying 
the obligation to respect fundamental rights and fundamental legal principles as en-
shrined in Art. 6 TEU”. In this vein, the twelfth and the thirteenth recitals clarify that the 
provisions on the EAW should be interpreted so as to prohibit surrender in case the 
person involved risks becoming subject to the death penalty, torture or inhuman and 
degrading treatment. Accordingly, judicial cooperation should be limited if prosecution 
or punishment are grounded on the requested person’s sex, race, religion, ethnic origin, 
nationality, language, political opinions or sexual orientation.47  
However, Arts 3, 4 and 4 bis of Framework Decision 2002/584 do not include fun-
damental rights concerns among the grounds for refusal of surrender.48 As mentioned 
 
45 European Parliament and Council Directive 2014/41/EU of 3 April 2014 regarding the European In-
vestigation Order in criminal matters. At the same time, the Directive 2014/42/EU on freezing and confis-
cation of instrumentalities and proceeds of crime, which was adopted on the same day, merely refers to 
proportionality in the seventeenth recital, taking the value of instrumentalities as the reference point for 
the case-by-case test (European Parliament and Council Directive 2014/42/EU of 3 April 2014 on the freez-
ing and confiscation of instrumentalities and proceeds of crime in the European Union). 
46 The EU legislator usually includes in preambles a clause stating that fundamental rights and the 
principles recognised by Art. 6 TEU are fully respected. However, scholars warn about the potential ef-
fects of such recurring recital. In fact, it could trigger an in abstracto presumption of conformity of the 
relevant secondary law with fundamental rights: F. BESTAGNO, I rapporti tra la Carta e le fonti secondarie di 
diritto dell’UE nella giurisprudenza della Corte di giustizia, in Diritti umani e diritto internazionale, 2015, pp. 
272-273. 
47 Recitals are important terms of reference for the proper interpretation of secondary law, as they 
state reasons for the adoption of an act and clarify its objectives. Despite being devoid of autonomous 
legal value, they can be used to determine the nature of a provision and to consequently orient its inter-
pretation: T. KLIMAS, J. VAICIUKAITE, The law of recitals in European Community legislation, in ILSA Journal of In-
ternational and Comparative Law, 2008, p. 61 et seq. 
48 This choice has been criticised, due to the risk of a violation of the rights enshrined in the Europe-
an Convention on Human Rights: S. ALEGRE, M. LEAF, Mutual recognition in European judicial co-operation: a 
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above, the list of those grounds is in principle exhaustive and the Court usually inter-
prets it narrowly.49  
The sole consequences attached to the risk of a violation of the Charter refer to ex-
ceptional situations. On the one hand, under Art. 23, para. 4, surrender can (exception-
ally) be postponed “for serious humanitarian reasons”, for example if there are substan-
tial grounds for believing that it would clearly endanger the requested person’s life or 
health. On the other hand, the tenth recital emphasises that the whole mechanism of 
the EAW may be suspended (exceptionally) only in the event of a serious and persistent 
breach of the principles set out in Art. 2 TEU, determined by the Council pursuant to Art. 
7, para. 2, TEU.50  
The absence of a specific and binding fundamental rights clause has led some 
commentators to consider that “hardly any fundamental guarantees of the accused 
person are ensured in this Framework Decision”.51 
This critical remark does not take into due account the overall legal framework of 
EU judicial cooperation mechanism in criminal matters, but it highlights a general gap of 
European secondary law in this domain. In fact, the wording of the Framework Decision 
reflects the general approach of the EU legislator.52 None of the acts adopted in this 
domain formally qualifies the protection of fundamental rights as a reason to reject a 
request for cooperation, with the sole exception of the EIO Directive. Pursuant to Art. 11 
of this Directive, an optional grounds for non recognition or non execution applies 
where there are substantial grounds to believe that the execution of the investigative 
 
step too far too soon? Case study: the European Arrest Warrant, in European Law Journal, 2004, p. 200 et seq. 
It has to be underlined that some Member States decided to include a specific human rights protection 
ground for refusal in their national laws implementing the Framework Decision 2002/584: L. KLIMEK, Euro-
pean Arrest Warrant, Berlin: Springer, 2015, pp. 214-216. 
49 The Court has consistently clarified that the national legislature is entitled to limit the scope of ap-
plication of the optional grounds for refusal, thereby facilitating surrender: Court of Justice, judgment of 6 
October 2009, case C-123/08, Wolzenburg. See S. MONTALDO, Mandato d’arresto europeo, principio del reci-
proco riconoscimento e diritti del condannato, in Diritti umani e diritto internazionale, 2013, p. 226 et seq.  
50 This limit to judicial cooperation is in any case dependent upon the outcomes of the political rem-
edy under Art. 7 TEU, whose effectiveness is a matter of debate, in light of the recent practice of the EU 
institutions: N. LAZZERINI, Less is more? Qualche rilievo sulla legittimità e il merito delle recenti iniziative delle 
istituzioni europee in materia di salvaguardia dei valori fondanti dell’Unione, in Rivista di diritto internazionale, 
2016, p. 514 et seq. See also E. CIMIOTTA, La prima volta per la procedura di controllo sul rispetto dei valori 
dell’Unione prevista dall’art. 7 TUE? Alcune implicazioni per l’integrazione europea, in European Papers, 2016, 
www.europeanpapers.eu, p. 1253 et seq. 
51 N.M. SCHALLMOSER, The European arrest warrant and fundamental rights, in European Journal of Crime, 
Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, 2014, p. 135. 
52 A gap that national legislators have often tried to fill, by including fundamental rights concerns in 
domestic implementing measures. For a general overview of the situation at national level: G. VAN 
TIGGELEN, A. WEYEMBERG, L. SURANO (eds), The future of mutual recognition in criminal matters, Bruxelles: Édi-
tions de l’Université de Bruxelles, 2009.  
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measure would be incompatible “with the State’s obligations under Art. 6 TEU and the 
Charter”.53 
The almost absolute lack of grounds for refusal is coupled by the systemic implica-
tions of the principle of mutual confidence between Member States. In fact, according 
to the Court, mutual trust requires “each of those States, save in exceptional circum-
stances, to consider all the other Member States to be complying with EU law and par-
ticularly with the fundamental rights recognised by EU law”.54  
Of course, EU institutions are subject to review regarding their conformity with 
Treaties and general principles of law, just like the Member States when they imple-
ment the law of the Union.55 The wording of the Framework Decision confirms that any 
decision relating to the EAW is attended by all appropriate guarantees resulting from 
fundamental rights and fundamental legal principles referred to by Art. 1, para. 3.56 
 
53 This wording may prospect a future new trend by the EU legislator, but such legislative choice has 
not been repeated in other recent secondary acts. Another partial exception can be found in Art. 20, para. 
3, of the Framework Decision 2005/214/JHA on the mutual recognition of financial penalties, whose field 
of application, however, has been considered too limited to ensure an effective scrutiny on the respect of 
fundamental rights: S. PEERS, EU Justice and Home Affairs Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 
725. Other limited exceptions refer to the need to ensure a smooth functioning of the cooperation mech-
anism despite the fragmentation of national procedural laws. For instance, see Art. 9, para. 2, of the Eu-
ropean Parliament and Council Directive 2014/41/EU of 3 April 2014 regarding the European Investigation 
Order in criminal matters: “The executing authority shall comply with the formalities and procedures ex-
pressly indicated by the issuing authority unless otherwise provided in this Directive and provided that 
such formalities and procedures are not contrary to the fundamental principles of law of the executing 
State”. Where no common provisions apply, the executing authority is entitled to derogate from the for-
malities required by the issuing one only in exceptional situations. 
54 Opinion 2/13, cit., para. 191.  
55 Court of Justice, judgment of 3 May 2007, case C-303/05, Advocaten voor de Wereld, para. 45. On 
the post-Lisbon approach of the Court to the review of legality of EU secondary law, D. SARMIENTO, Who’s 
afraid of the Charter? The Court of Justice, national courts and the new framework of fundamental rights pro-
tection in Europe, in Common Market Law Review, 2013, p. 1267 et seq.; F. BESTAGNO, I rapporti fra la Carta e le 
fonti secondarie, cit., p. 259 et seq. From this point of view, two sources of potential limits to mutual trust 
and mutual recognition have been identified. Firstly, vertical limits, concerning EU and national legislators’ 
activities. Both are bound by the Charter while adopting EU secondary legislation and the subsequent 
implementing measures. Secondly, and more remarkably, these general principles can be limited hori-
zontally, on a case by case basis, in the event the Charter is breached or could be breached because of 
the completion of a judicial cooperation mechanism: K. LENAERTS, J.A. GUTIÉRREZ FONS, The European Court of 
Justice and fundamental rights in the field of criminal law, in V. MITSILEGAS, M. BERGSTRÖM, T. KONSTADINIDES 
(eds), Research Handbook on European criminal law, cit., p. 15. 
56 Court of Justice, judgment of 10 November 2016, case C-477/16 PPU, Kovalkovas, para. 37. Accord-
ing to the Court, the protection of fundamental rights implies that the entire surrender procedure must 
be carried out under judicial supervision. It follows that also the decision on issuing an EAW must be tak-
en by a judicial authority. Moreover, the notion of judicial authority requires autonomous and uniform 
interpretation, which must take into account the text, context and objective of the Council Framework 
Decision: Court of Justice, judgment of 10 November 2016, case C-452/16 PPU, Poltorak, paras 32-39. See 
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However, so far, when confronted with the need to strike a balance between the 
protection of fundamental rights and the full effectiveness of EU law, the CJEU has man-
ifested a clear favour for the latter.57 Melloni emphasises that the exhaustive nature of 
the list of grounds for refusal prevents States from opposing judicial cooperation by in-
voking a higher standard of protection of an individual right than the level set by the 
Charter.58 In such cases, more extensive protection equals to an undue restriction to 
the primacy of EU law and the effective functioning of judicial cooperation mecha-
nisms.59 
Also, in Radu, the Court considered that the executing judicial authorities could not 
refuse to give effect to an EAW on the grounds that the requested person had not been 
heard before that arrest warrant was issued. A similar situation does not feature among 
the grounds for non-execution and cannot be derived from the wording of Arts 47 and 
48 of the Charter.60 Instead, an obligation for the judicial authorities to hear the re-
quested person before an EAW was issued would “inevitably lead to the failure of the 
very system of surrender”.61 This would undermine the “certain element of surprise” of 
the procedure, which is essential in order to stop the person concerned from taking 
flight, as a side effect of the freedom of movement.62 
In the same vein, the Court acknowledged that the implementation of optional 
grounds for refusal at national level must comply with the principle of non-
discrimination. It then found the restrictions respectively imposed by The Netherlands 
and Germany to the field of application of Art. 4, para. 6, of the Framework Decision 
2002/584 to be proportionate and objectively justified, even if they introduced a differ-
 
also Advocaten voor de Wereld, cit., para. 53, for what concerns the principle of legality of criminal offences 
and penalties. 
57 E. HERLIN-KARNELL, From mutual trust to the full effectiveness of EU law, cit., pp. 86-87; S. RODIN, Useful 
effect of the Framework decision on the European Arrest Warrant, in Il diritto dell’Unione europea, 2016, p. 1 et 
seq. It has also been underlined that, by facilitating judicial cooperation, the full effectiveness of Area of 
freedom, security and justice measures does not undermine the effectiveness of national criminal law: K. 
LENAERTS, The principle of mutual recognition, cit., p. 526. 
58 Melloni, cit., para. 63. According to AG Bot, the imposition of a common EU standard of protection 
is necessary in order to avoid forum shopping in the European judicial area: Opinion of AG Bot delivered 
on 2 October 2012, case C-399/11, Melloni, para. 103. 
59 The finding of the Court has been extensively commented, see for instance N. DE BOER, Addressing 
rights divergences under the Charter: Melloni, in Common Market Law Review, 2013, p. 1083 et seq.; J. 
VERVAELE, The European arrest warrant and the applicable standards of fundamental rights in the EU, in Review 
of European Administrative Law, 2013, p. 40 et seq.; V. SKOURIS, Développements récents de la protection des 
droits fondamentaux dans l’Union européenne: les arrêts Melloni et Ackerberg Fransson, in Il diritto dell’Unione 
europea, 2013, p. 229 et seq.; A. D’ALOIA, Europa e diritti: luci e ombre dello schema di protezione multilevel, in 
Il diritto dell’Unione europea, 2014, p. 1 et seq. 
60 Radu, cit., para. 39. 
61 Ivi, para. 40. 
62 The risk of absconding and impunity plays an increasing role in the case-law of the Court of Jus-
tice: see also Court of Justice, judgment of 27 May 2014, case C-129/14 PPU, Spasic, paras 63-65.  
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ent regime for nationals and other EU citizens.63 In fact, the CJEU affirmed that, by 
transposing Art. 4, para. 6, Member States are allowed to limit the situations in which 
the executing judicial authorities may refuse to surrender a person who falls within the 
scope of that provision,64 thereby reinforcing the mechanism of cooperation in accord-
ance with the principle of mutual recognition.65  
This general approach has been critically appraised by legal scholars.66 The Court 
has been considered evidently less concerned with protecting the fundamental rights of 
individuals granted by primary law than with safeguarding the intention of the govern-
ments, when they made secondary legislation.67 Moreover, relying on the effectiveness 
of the mechanism would hamper more strategic objectives, such as strengthening the 
chances of the offenders’ future rehabilitation, as an integral part of human dignity.68 
 
63 Kozlowski and Wolzemburg, cit. The case-law of the Court has raised extensive debate on the bal-
ance between the effectiveness of the system of surrender, citizenship rights and the protection of pri-
vate and family life. Also, the execution of an EAW can have a remarkable impact on the chances of per-
sonal and social integration of the offender and therefore directly affects the resocialisation goal that 
criminal sanctions should pursue. S. PEERS, The European Arrest Warrant: the dilemmas of mutual recogni-
tion, human rights and citizenship, in A. ROSAS, E. LEVITS, Y. BOT, The Court of Justice and the construction of 
Europe. Analyses and perspectives on sixty years of case-law – La Cour de Justice et la construction de l’Europe. 
Analyses et perspectives de soixante ans de jurisprudence, Den Haag: Asser Press, 2013, p. 523 et seq.; S. 
MONTALDO, Mandato d’arresto europeo, cit.  
64 Wolzemburg, cit., paras 58 and 59. 
65 On the other hand, Art. 18 TFEU means EU countries cannot completely exempt visiting or resident 
citizens of other Member States from being subject to these grounds for refusal. Court of Justice, judgment 
of 5 September 2012, case C-42/11, Lopes da Silva. S. RIGHI, Il caso Lopes da Silva Jorge: Il difficile equilibrio fra 
mandato d’arresto europeo e diritti fondamentali, in Il diritto dell’Unione europea, 2013, p. 859 et seq. 
66 Of course, the Court’s view has attracted also positive explanations. According to certain authors 
the standard set by the EU legislator by the means of secondary legislation is a matter of policy choice 
which needs to be compatible with the level ensured by the Charter; V. SKOURIS, Développements récents, 
cit., p. 241. It follows that, from a vertical perspective, the Court of Justice takes responsibility for the bal-
ancing between mutual recognition and fundamental rights, by examining whether the EU legislator “has 
placed too much weight on mutual recognition”: K. LENAERTS, J.A. GUTIÉRREZ FONS, The European Court of Jus-
tice and fundamental rights, cit., p. 25. 
67 L. BESSELINK, The parameters of constitutional conflict after Melloni, in European Law Review, 2014, p. 
551. See also V. MITSILEGAS, Mutual recognition, mutual trust and fundamental rights, cit., p. 160, according to 
whom the Court has “deified mutual trust”. 
68 P. MENGOZZI, La cooperazione giudiziaria europea e il principio fondamentale di tutela della dignità 
umana, in Studi sull’integrazione europea, 2014, p. 225 et seq. Scholars have criticised also the adoption of a 
uniform approach to the prerogatives deriving from residence or stay in a host Member State. The limits 
to the scope of the optional grounds for refusal of surrender under Art. 4, para. 6, of Council Framework 
Decision 2002/584, cit., and the proportionality assessment on their compatibility with primary law are 
shaped on a similar reading of the limits to the access to social benefits in the internal market. See for 
instance in parallel Wolzenburg, cit., paras 63-74, and Court of Justice, judgment of 18 November 2008, 
case C-158/07, Förster. On such parallel, C. JANSSENS, Case C-123/08, Dominic Wolzenburg, judgment of the 
Court (Grand Chamber) of 6 October 2009, in Common Market Law Review, 2010, p. 831 et seq. Moreover, the 
case-law of the Court does not go into the need to protect the right to private and family life, which is in-
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Other scholars have pointed out a lack of institutional empathy on the part of the Court 
of Justice.69 
V. Set on a collision course: from N.S. to the recent case-law on 
fundamental rights and the execution of a European arrest 
warrant 
v.1. Overcoming mutual trust in exceptional situations: N.S. 
The Court left many questions unanswered and a collision was just a matter of time. 
Important signals came from AGs, pointing out that the interpretation of the Frame-
work Decision 2002/584 in the light of fundamental rights “has become more impera-
tive since the entry into force of the Charter”.70 More generally, Art. 1, para. 3, was de-
scribed as a codification of a pre-existing duty to respect fundamental rights, which 
permeates the Framework Decision and the EU legal order as a whole.71 The idea of a 
new fundamental rights-oriented approach to the wording of the Framework Decision 
and of judicial cooperation mechanisms in general was further supported by AG Men-
gozzi. In his view, Art. 1, para. 3, should be read in light of the pivotal role of human dig-
nity, the cornerstone of the Charter, and should subsequently allow for limitations to 
the principle of mutual recognition.72 
The need for a new balance between the opposite poles was also unveiled by the 
case-law on the relationship between secondary law and the Charter. In particular, in 
the well-known N.S. case,73 the Court was confronted with the criteria set out by Regula-
tion 343/2003 (Dublin II Regulation) to identify the State responsible for the examina-
tion of an asylum application.74 The Regulation was deemed to create a categorical duty 
 
stead taken into consideration in the judgments concerning the restriction of the freedom of movement 
on the grounds of public order and public security: Court of Justice, judgment of 23 November 2010, case 
C-145/09, Tsakouridis, para. 52. 
69 P. MARTIN RODRIGUEZ, Crónica de una muerte anunciada: comentario a la sentencia del Tribunal de Jus-
ticia (Gran Sala), de 26 de febrero dl 2013, Stefano Melloni, in Revista general de derecho europeo, 2013, p. 34. 
70 Opinion of AG Cruz Villalòn delivered on 6 July 2010, case C-306/09, I.B., para. 44. 
71 Opinion of AG Sharpston delivered on 18 October 2012, case C-396/11, Radu, paras 51 and 70. 
72 Opinion of AG Mengozzi delivered on 20 March 2012, case C-42/11, Lopes da Silva, para. 28: “Article 
1(3) is at pain to remind us [...] that the protection of fundamental rights [...] must be the overriding concern 
of the national legislature when it transposes acts of the European Union, of the national judicial authorities 
when they avail themselves of the powers devolved to them by European Union law, but also of the Court 
when it receives questions on the interpretation of the provisions of Framework Decision 2002/584”. 
73 Court of Justice, judgment of 21 December 2011, joined cases C-411/10 and C-493/10, N.S. A com-
ment from the point of view of mutual recognition and fundamental rights: M. MÖSTL, Limit and precondi-
tions, cit., p. 409. 
74 Council Regulation 343/2003 of 18 February 2003 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for de-
termining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application lodged in one of the Mem-
ber States by a third country national. This Regulation has been recently repealed by the European Par-
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of cooperation upon the Member States, for the benefit of the effectiveness of the 
whole asylum system.75 Art. 3, para. 2, of the Dublin II Regulation provided for a certain 
margin of discretion in favour of the receiving State. Nonetheless, it did not mention 
fundamental rights concerns as a possible trigger of its application. 
In this context, the Court underlined that EU law precludes the application of a con-
clusive presumption that the Member State responsible for an asylum application ob-
serves the fundamental rights.76 As a consequence, the Dublin II system could not be 
considered necessarily automatic. Instead, following the duty to interpret secondary law 
in light of the Charter, the national authorities are required to verify whether the coun-
try of destination ensures an appropriate level of protection of fundamental rights. In 
particular, they cannot transfer an asylum seeker to the formally competent Member 
State if systemic deficiencies in the asylum procedure and reception conditions therein 
amount to substantial grounds for believing that the person involved would face a real 
risk of being subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment.77  
Therefore, the Court rejected the idea of a blind application of the criteria set out by 
Regulation 343/2003 to identify the State responsible for the examination of an asylum 
application.78 In the event of a manifest and systemic violation of fundamental rights, 
the protection of the Charter outweighs the implementation of the mechanism for regu-
lating the treatment of refugees and justifies a limit to inter-State cooperation.79 
 
liament and Council Regulation 604/2013 of 26 June 2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for 
determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection 
lodged in one of the Member States by a third country national or a stateless person (Dublin III). 
75 C. CONTARTESE, The (rebuttable) presumption of the European Union Member States as ‘safe countries’ 
under the Dublin regulation, in C. AKRIVOPOULOU, N. GARIPIDIS (eds), Human rights and risks in the digital era: 
globalization and the effects of information technologies, Hershey: IGI Global, 2012, p. 240 et seq. 
76 N.S. followed a judgment delivered by the European Court of Human Rights on the same subject: 
European Court of Human Rights, judgment of 21 January 2011, no. 30696/09, M.S.S. v. Greece and Bel-
gium. The Strasbourg Court, on that occasion, underlined for the first time that the presumption for re-
spect of fundamental rights between Member States is rebuttable. See in particular paras 340 and 345. 
77 N.S., cit., para. 94. In practice, the State where the asylum seeker has lodged the applications is then un-
der the obligation to either consider whether another Member State can be identified as responsible for that 
application, in light of the criteria set out by Regulation 343/2003, or to examine the application itself. 
78 N.S., cit., paras 99 and 100. 
79 The systemic deficiency threshold represents the translation of the findings of the European Court 
of Human Rights, judgment M.S.S. v. Greece and Belgium, cit., in the EU legal order. As far as the asylum 
system is concerned, this solution has been also codified in the Dublin III Regulation 604/2013. The re-
formed Art. 3, para. 2, states that “Where it is impossible to transfer an applicant to the Member State 
primarily designated as responsible because there are substantial grounds for believing that there are 
systemic flaws in the asylum procedure and in the reception conditions for applicants in that Member 
State, resulting in a risk of inhuman or degrading treatment [...], the determining Member State shall con-
tinue to examine the criteria set out in Chapter III in order to establish whether another Member State 
can be designated as responsible”.  
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Consequently, the relevant national authorities are under the obligation to set aside 
the obligation to cooperate imposed by a Regulation.80 An obligation which is inherent 
to the EU legal order and which binds the Member States to react to serious violations 
committed in another member State, even in case they benefit from a certain margin of 
discretion.81 
Then, by analogy, the question is whether and to what extent the Charter imposes 
the establishment of a new mandatory ground for non execution of an EAW, where mu-
tual recognition of the foreign decision and surrender would lead to a manifest breach 
of fundamental rights.82 In fact, an extensive reading of this judgment would require 
some adjustments and steps further. As pointed out in the previous paragraph, where-
as the Dublin II Regulation left room to the Member States’ competences, the Frame-
work Decision 2002/584 provides a comprehensive and strict list of grounds for refusal 
of cooperation. Any addition to the exhaustive wording of the Framework Decision 
could then elude the will of the EU legislator. 
v.2. Collision ahead! Mutual recognition, detention conditions and 
inhuman and degrading treatments 
The Court was soon challenged with these questions in Lanigan. The case concerned the 
failure to respect the time-limits for the adoption of a decision on execution of an EAW, 
stipulated by Art. 17, of Framework Decision 2002/584. In its order for reference to the 
CJEU, the High Court of Ireland pointed out that the Irish procedural system was struc-
 
80 P. GRAGL, The shortcomings of Dublin II: Strasbourg’s M.S.S. judgment and its implications for the Euro-
pean Union’s legal order, in European Yearbook of Human Rights, 2012, p. 123. 
81 From this point of view, the Court of Justice draws inspiration from the case-law of the European 
Court of Human Rights. In particular, the Soering case has a specific relevance, since on that occasion the 
Strasbourg Court found that a Contracting Party can be held responsible for the violation of a fundamen-
tal right committed abroad, as long as it does not react to a serious risk of such violation and surrenders 
a fugitive to the requesting State. European Court of Human Rights, judgment of 7 July 1989, no. 
14038/88, Soering v. United Kingdom. N.S. sharply differs from Soering as to the territorial limits to the ju-
risdiction of the Court. Soering focused on the execution of a request for extradition issued by US authori-
ties in relation to a capital murder. Under Virginia law, the offence was punishable by death or life im-
prisonment. According to the Strasbourg Court, the serious risk of being subjected to death penalty 
amounted to a violation of Art. 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
82 Several scholars have urged a positive answer to this question, claiming that Art. 1, para. 3, of the 
EAW Framework Decision allows for (at least) such interpretation. See for instance T.P. MARGUERY, The pro-
tection of fundamental rights, cit.; F. BILLING, The parallel between non-removal of asylum seekers and non-
execution of a European arrest warrant on human rights grounds: the CJEU case of N.S. v. Secretary of State for 
the Home Department, in European Criminal Law Review, 2012, p. 77 et seq.; C. AMALFITANO, Mandato d’arresto 
europeo: reciproco riconoscimento vs diritti fondamentali?, in Diritto penale contemporaneo, 4 luglio 2013, 
www.penalecontemporaneo.it; V. MITSILEGAS, The symbiotic relationship, cit., p. 460 et seq. The latter author, 
in particular, urges a more ambitious reading of the implications of N.S., which should be extended to the 
assessment of individual situations. On this point see the next concluding paragraphs. 
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turally unable to function within those time-limits, thereby reporting a generalised defi-
ciency of the national legal order. The referring Court then asked whether such a situa-
tion could prevent the holding of the requested person in custody and eventually neu-
tralise the duty to execute the EAW, in light of Art. 6 of the Charter.  
On one hand, the Court acknowledged that mutual recognition is not absolute and 
that the presumption that all Member States respect fundamental rights is not conclu-
sive. On the other hand, it considered that a suspect’s maintenance in custody is pre-
cluded only insofar as the duration of the procedure is excessive in relation to the case’s 
characteristics and the procedure itself has been carried out in a sufficiently diligent 
manner. However, the duty to execute the EAW persists.83 If the national authority de-
cides to bring the requested person’s custody to an end, it is consequently required to 
attach any measures it deems necessary to the provisional release so as to prevent him 
from absconding and to ensure that the material conditions for his effective surrender 
remain fulfilled for as long as no final decision on the execution has been taken.84 The 
Court’s findings set a clear dividing line between the standards for the management of 
the execution procedure and its outcomes. On the one hand, fundamental rights signif-
icantly influence the management of the execution procedure, which is attended by all 
guarantees appropriate for it.85 On the other hand they do not limit the full effective-
ness of the surrender system, even in the event of a self-admitted systemic deficiency 
of the Irish legal order. 
The inheritance of N.S. for the EU legal order was once again debated in the joined 
cases Aranyosi and Căldăraru, where the Bremen’s court of appeal was asked to execute 
two arrest warrants, respectively issued by a Romanian district court and a Hungarian 
first instance court. The referring court raised serious concerns about the risk of a viola-
tion of the prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatment, due to the chronic and 
generalised deficiencies of the prison systems in the issuing Member States.  
The national court’s findings, in particular, were confirmed by several judgments of 
the European Court of Human Rights and by a report issued by the European Commit-
tee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. 
 
83 Lanigan, cit., paras 37 and 40. 
84 Ivi, paras 59 and 63. 
85 From this point of view, both the issuing and the executing authorities are bound by the duty to 
respect fundamental rights in any aspect of their activity. This approach reflects the Court’s case-law on 
the notion of judicial authority. Only judicial authorities capable of ensuring adequate procedural guaran-
tees are entitled to issue or execute an European arrest warrant or other requests for judicial coopera-
tion. Court of Justice, judgment of 30 May 2013, case C-168/13 PPU, F., para. 45; Poltorak, cit., para. 39. 
The Court has also clarified that even a confirmation by a public prosecutor’s office of a national arrest 
warrant issued previously by a police service in connection with criminal proceedings constitutes a judi-
cial decision under the aims of the Council Framework Decision 2002/584, cit., since it ensures an appro-
priate scrutiny on the decision at stake: Court of Justice, judgment of 10 November 2016, case C-453/16 
PPU, Özçelik, paras 30, 34 and 38.  
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Indeed, in light of the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights,86 Art. 3 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights, which corresponds in toto to Art. 4 of the Char-
ter,87 implies the positive obligation to ensure that detention conditions respect human 
dignity and prisoners’ health and well-being. Detention must not cause distress or hard-
ship of an intensity exceeding the unavoidable level of suffering that is inherent in it.88 
As a consequence, the German court urged the CJEU to find a way out of the golden 
rule “recognise and execute”, also in view of the fact that the prohibition stipulated in 
Art. 4 of the Charter is absolute and closely related to human dignity, a founding pillar 
of the European legal order. 
In this context, building on its opinion 2/13 on the draft accession agreement of the 
EU to the European Convention on Human Rights,89 the CJEU confirmed that, as a rule, 
the Member States are prevented from checking whether another Member State “has 
actually, in a specific case, observed the fundamental rights guaranteed by the EU”.90 
Yet, mutual recognition and mutual trust are not absolute: the presumption concerning 
the appropriate level of protection of fundamental rights can be rebutted, albeit only in 
exceptional circumstances.91 The question then arises as to the meaning and practical 
implications of such extreme situations. 
In order to verify whether in concreto the protection of fundamental rights should 
prevail over the effective functioning of the system of surrender, the executing judicial 
authority has to make a two-step assessment. Firstly, the relevant national authority 
must rely on “objective, specific, reliable and properly updated” information on the ex-
istence of deficiencies in detention conditions in the issuing Member State.92 Such defi-
ciencies “may be systemic or generalised” and may affect certain groups of people or 
specific places of detention.93 
Secondly, and additionally, the executing authority is required to make a further 
and more detailed analysis. Building on the detection of general deficiencies, it has to 
 
86 See for instance European Court of Human Rights, judgment of 10 June 2014, no. 22015/10, Voicu 
v. Romania; European Court of Human Rights, judgment of 10 March 2015, no. 14097/12, Varga v. Hungary. 
87 See the explanations on Art. 4, attached to the Charter. In both systems, these are considered ab-
solute rights, which cannot be derogated. 
88 European Court of Human Rights, judgment of 8 January 2013, nos 43517/09, 46882/09, 55400/09, 
57875/09, 61535/09, 35315/10, 37818/10, Torreggiani et al. v. Italy. On the subject, G. DELLA MORTE, La situa-
zione carceraria italiana viola “strutturalmente” gli standard sui diritti umani (a margine della sentenza Torreg-
giani c. Italia), in Diritti umani e diritto internazionale, 2013, p. 147 et seq.; on the consequences of the case-
law of the European Court of Human Rights: S. FOSTER, The effective supervision of European prison condi-
tions, in F. IPPOLITO, S. IGLESIAS SÁNCHEZ (eds), Protecting vulnerable groups. The European human rights frame-
work, Cheltenham: Hart Publishing, 2015, p. 381 et seq. 
89 Opinion 2/13, cit., para. 192. 
90 Ivi, para.191. 
91 Aranyosi and Căldăraru, cit., para. 82. 
92 Ivi, para. 89. 
93 Ivi, para. 93. 
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verify whether there are substantial grounds to consider that the person requested will 
actually be exposed to the risk of a violation of Art. 4 of the Charter.94 
At this stage, the executing authority has, in principle, two alternatives. If the infor-
mation collected is precise and reliable enough to discount the risk of inhuman and de-
grading treatment, a decision on execution must be timely adopted. However, if a real 
risk is identified, “the execution of that warrant must be postponed but it cannot be 
abandoned”.95 Here the CJEU quoted its findings in Lanigan and, rather than qualifying 
the protection of fundamental rights as grounds for refusal of execution, it confirmed a 
manifest preference for a delayed surrender.96 
So, what if the real risk of a violation persists, despite postponing execution? In that 
case, after a reasonable time, the surrender procedure can be brought to an end, as a 
last resort, since the requested person cannot suffer inhuman and degrading treatment 
because of the execution of a warrant. Nonetheless, it is highly suggestive that this very 
last and neglected third alternative laconically appeared in the final line of the judg-
ment. The CJEU did not even take it into consideration in its legal arguments, which are 
instead entirely focused on the need to preserve the functioning of the EAW system. 
In general terms, departing from its effectiveness-centered precedents,97 the Court 
tried to avoid mutual recognition, mutual trust and the protection of fundamental rights 
locking swords. The attempt to reconcile the meteors set on a collision course will need 
further clarifications at both legislative and judicial levels. Yet such long-awaited revised 
balance has two major consequences. The evolution of the N.S. case-law will have sev-
eral implications for judicial cooperation in criminal matters as a whole, in terms of in-
creased empowerment of the issuing and executing authorities. Moreover, it represents 
an important stress-test on the state of the art of fundamental rights protection in the 
EU. Both the practical and structural future perspectives will be addressed in the follow-
ing concluding remarks. 
 
94 In particular, to this purpose, the executing authority can ask for supplementary information from 
the issuing authority, pursuant to Art. 15, para. 2, of Council Framework Decision 2002/584, cit., or even 
rely on any other information available. See infra, section VI.4. 
95 Aranyosi and Căldăraru, cit., para. 98. 
96 In case execution is postponed, the executing authority must inform Eurojust, pursuant to Art. 17, 
para. 7, of Council Framework Decision 2002/584, cit. Another aspect related to the postponement of ex-
ecution is the maintenance of the requested person in custody. In line with Lanigan, the Court underlined 
that detention can be maintained only if the executing authority coped with the EAW in a sufficiently dili-
gent manner and the duration of the deprivation of freedom is proportionate to the circumstances of the 
case. In case of a warrant issued for prosecution purposes, the executing authority must take into ac-
count the presumption of innocence, guaranteed by Art. 48 of the Charter: Lanigan, cit., paras 58-60; 
Aranyosi and Căldăraru, cit., para. 100. 
97 See supra, section IV. 
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VI. Towards a post-collision order? Practical implications of the 
revised balance between mutual recognition, mutual trust and 
fundamental rights protection  
vi.1. A new ground for postponing (and, as a last resort, abandoning) 
execution 
The Court acknowledged that mutual recognition and fundamental rights have to be 
weighed against each other. On the one hand, mutual recognition is not absolute, but it 
can be set aside only in exceptional circumstances. On the other hand, the Court re-
fused to qualify a (risk of) violation of the Charter as compulsory grounds for non-
execution of an EAW. Instead, building on Art. 1, para. 3, of Framework Decision 
2002/584, it opted for an ex novo mandatory ground for postponement of execution, 
which leaves the door open to the surrender of the requested person. 
At the same time, the Court’s overall legal reasoning and the last words of the 
judgment made clear that the Charter does places a de facto limit to the golden rule 
“recognise and execute”. Since the implementation of the EAW mechanism, and of EU 
secondary law in general, cannot lead to a manifest violation of a fundamental right, the 
Charter, as a last resort, can impose the abandonment of the surrender procedure. 
This is not a matter of mere formalities or definitions. First, as already underlined, 
while accepting the existence of additional and general limits to the full effectiveness of 
judicial cooperation mechanisms, the Court revises the balance it struck in its prece-
dents, in favour of increased attention to fundamental rights. Second, the new manda-
tory ground for postponement/abandonment does not share the legal regime of the 
grounds for non-execution provided by secondary law, which remain an autonomous 
and exhaustive legal category. Therefore, the impact of the findings of the Court on the 
EAW mechanism and on judicial cooperation in criminal matters in general is uncertain.  
Caught between the need to preserve the effective implementation of EU law and 
the aspiration to strengthen its role as a fundamental rights guardian,98 the Court of 
Justice draws an undefined dividing line between minor infringements and exceptional 
situations resulting in systemic flaws.99 Such a demarcation engenders a range of po-
tential blocks to the precise implementation of EU secondary law, which mainly depend 
on the interpretation of the exceptional situations threshold. Marking the boundaries of 
 
98 The role of the Court has been extensively discussed and the acquired primary legal value of the 
Charter has further amplified the quest for a true EU human rights adjudicator. See for instance J.H.H. 
WEILER, N. LOCKHART, “Taking rights seriously” seriously: the European Court and its fundamental rights juris-
prudence, in Common Market Law Review, 1995, p. 51 et seq.; G. DE BÚRCA, After the EU Charter of fundamental 
rights: the Court of Justice as a human rights adjudicator?, in Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative 
Law, 2013, p. 168 et seq. 
99 In N.S., cit., paras 82, 84 and 85, the Court respectively referred to “any infringement”, “slightest in-
fringement” and “minor infringements” of fundamental rights. 
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such notion implies a three-limbs assessment: a quantitative appraisal on the presence 
of a systemic flaw; a qualitative evaluation of the rights at stake; a reliability test on 
available information concerning the Member State’s failure to respect the EU level of 
protection of a fundamental right. Each of these parameters needs further clarifica-
tions. 
vi.2. Systemic deficiencies, individual violations? 
The Court links the new mandatory ground for postponement/abandonment to the 
demonstration of deficiencies, “which may be systemic or generalised”.100 At first sight, 
it seems to resort by analogy to the approach adopted in N.S., according to which only 
serious and widespread situations can result in a duty to identify a new Member State 
responsible for an asylum application.101 
In the AG Bot’s view, the N.S. formula doesn’t suit cooperation in criminal matters 
perfectly. Even if the situation giving rise to judgments under consideration is theoreti-
cally comparable to N.S. regarding the presence of a systemic flaw, such a background 
is a mere occasio that does not allow for analogy. In fact, the two domains at stake 
sharply differ as to form, objectives and substance of EU intervention. Asylum law is ful-
ly harmonised at European level, while in criminal matters the European Union can only 
adopt minimum harmonisation measures. The common European asylum system aims 
at providing a safe harbour for those who flee from persecution; judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters, and the EAW in particular, is intended to strengthen prosecution and 
punishment of criminal conduct throughout Europe, avoiding the risk of absconding 
and the creation of refuge States for offenders.102 
In theory, these arguments touch on the core elements of the EAW, but a more am-
bitious reading of the judgment would be advisable. The scene set by the Court leaves 
room for greater importance of fundamental rights concerns, irrespectively of their sys-
temic or individual nature. 
This view is supported first of all by the legal reasoning of the Court itself. The gen-
eral premise of the Court is that the enforcement of the EAW cannot lead to a violation 
 
100 Aranyosi and Căldăraru, cit., para. 104. 
101 N.S., cit. 
102 In the aftermath of the N.S. judgment it was underlined also that the findings of the Court would 
not have provided incentives to improve asylum seekers’ reception conditions in Greece. That Member 
State could instead benefit from the new general limit to the ordinary functioning of the asylum system, 
spilling over immigration flows into the other Member States. I. CANOR, My brother’s keeper? Horizontal 
Solange: “an ever closer distrust among the peoples of Europe”, in Common Market Law Review, 2013, p. 407. A 
strengthened fundamental rights test would not deploy similar negative effects in the domain of judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters. The common interest to security in the EU judicial area is in fact a power-
ful engine towards the effectiveness of the system and, ultimately, the improvement of the protection of 
fundamental rights at national level. 
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of fundamental rights and such statement would hardly fit with a distinction between 
generalised deficiencies and specific failures to comply with the Charter. Therefore, the 
CJEU urges the executing authorities to refuse the surrender even when the risk of in-
human and degrading treatment may affect “certain groups of people” or “certain plac-
es of detention”.103 Moreover, the Court does not require that a certain number of peo-
ple be affected. Instead, it focuses its attention on the assessment of a real risk for the 
individual concerned. The overall situation of the prison system can be a signal or even 
a premise for further investigation, but de facto the executing authority needs to receive 
reassurance regarding the detention conditions the requested person will undergo. 
Then, the focal point is the substantial grounds for believing that, upon surrender, 
an individual will face a real risk of being subject to inhuman or degrading treatment, 
irrespectively of the identification of confirmed systemic deficiency. Whether that real 
risk represents the individual materialisation of a generalised failure to comply with 
fundamental rights or not, its substance doesn’t change. If individual situations were 
excluded from the implications of Art. 1, para. 3, of the Framework Decision, EU law 
would ratify, if not urge, the violation of a fundamental right. 
This conclusion is confirmed by the case-law of the European Court of Human 
Rights following M.S.S. v. Greece and Belgium. In Tarakhel v. Switzerland,104 the Strasbourg 
Court went a step further and clarified that effective protection of fundamental rights 
requires an assessment of the impact of a State’s conduct on the individual concerned. 
In particular, the protection of fundamental rights in a specific situation prevails over an 
obligation of inter-State cooperation even in the event a generalised deficiency in the 
Member State involved has not been ascertained.105 An individualised case-by-case as-
sessment cannot therefore be set aside “in the name of uncritical presumed mutual 
trust”.106 Any diverging reading would amount to opening the door to a lower protec-
tion than the level ensured within the system of the European Convention on Human 
Rights.107 
Another convincing argument derives from the case-law of the Court of Justice. In 
Lanigan, the Court highlighted that the holding of the requested person for a period ex-
ceeding the time necessary to execute an EAW is compatible with Art. 6 of the Charter 
 
103 Aranyosi and Căldăraru, cit., paras 89 and 104. 
104 European Court of Human Rights, judgment of 4 November 2014, no. 29217/12, Tarakhel v. 
Switzerland. 
105 At para. 115, the Strasbourg Court underlined that “[w]hile the structure and overall situation of 
the reception arrangements in Italy cannot [...] in themselves act as a bar to all removals of asylum seek-
ers”, the risk that a number of asylum seekers may be left without accommodation or accommodated in 
overcrowded facilities, or even in insalubrious or violent conditions, “cannot be dismissed as unfounded”. 
106 V. MITSILEGAS, Mutual recognition, mutual trust and fundamental rights, cit., p. 160. 
107 The risk of diverging standards of protection is pointed out by D. HALBERSTAM, It’s the autonomy, 
stupid! A modest defense of opinion 2/13 on EU accession to the ECHR, and the way forward, in German Law 
Journal, 2015, p. 105 et seq. 
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only insofar as the whole procedure has been carried out with due diligence.108 The ap-
propriate conduct of any procedural phase of the EAW mechanism is in fact a minimum 
denominator common to both the issuing and the executing authorities. In its prelimi-
nary ruling in Kossowski, the Court has recently clarified that a plain lack of diligence on 
the part of the issuing authority should in principle bar mutual recognition and mutual 
trust.109 In particular, the ne bis in idem principle does not apply to out-of-court deci-
sions dismissing criminal proceedings on the grounds of insufficient evidence, “when it 
is clear from the statement of reasons for that decision that the procedure was closed 
without a detailed investigation having been carried out”.110 Consequently, a national 
authority is entitled not to recognise a foreign decision evidently failing to fulfil a mini-
mum level of diligence, which amounts to a necessary precondition of mutual trust. This 
finding has important implications because of two main reasons. 
Firstly, the Court of Justice confirms that judicial cooperation should be limited only 
in extreme cases. In Kossowski, the exceptional block to mutual trust takes the form of a 
plain lack of a diligent investigation on the part of the issuing judicial authority. What is 
more, such a deficiency has to be evidently derived from the statement of reasons for 
the foreign decision. In fact, for the purposes of the ne bis in idem, the receiving national 
authority is in principle prevented from assessing the foreign authority’s activity.111 
Secondly, this general and exceptional limit to judicial cooperation is not dependent 
upon the ascertainment of a systemic deficiency in the issuing Member State. On the 
contrary, it includes even individual situations, in which a case-by-case assessment 
leads to consider that mutual trust is barred. 
If an exceptional lack of diligence can block mutual recognition and mutual trust on 
an individual basis, a fortiori manifest infringements of fundamental rights should trig-
ger a similar regime, irrespectively of their systemic or individualised nature. Therefore, 
the new mandatory ground for postponement/abandonment of execution should apply 
even when the executing judicial authority has gathered reliable evidence of a specific 
deficiency, resulting in a concrete risk of an individual failure to respect the Charter. 
The confinement of the scope of application of the mandatory ground for post-
ponement/abandonment of execution to exceptional situations could then be better 
read in relation to the seriousness of the violation of a fundamental right. In line with 
 
108 Lanigan, cit., para. 58. A similar approach is followed by the European Court of Human Rights in 
relation to the deprivation of freedom in the framework of an extradition procedure: European Court of 
Human Rights, judgment of 25 March 2015, no. 11620/07, Gallardo Sanchez v. Italy. 
109 Court of Justice, judgment of 29 June 2016, case C-486/14, Kossowski. 
110 Kossowski, cit., paras 53 and 54. 
111 A. WEYEMBERGH, La jurisprudence de la CJ relative au principe ne bis in idem: une contribution essen-
tielle à la reconnaissance mutuelle en matière pénale, in A. ROSAS, E. LEVITS, Y. BOT (eds), La Cour de Justice et la 
construction de l’Europe: analyses et perspectives de soixante ans de jurisprudence, Den Haag: Asser Press, 
2013, pp. 542-544. Gözütok and Brügge, cit., para. 33; Court of Justice, judgment of 28 September 2006, 
case C-467/04, Gasparini, para. 30. 
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the Court of Justice’s approach in Bosphorus,112 irrespectively of the number of in-
fringements, a manifestly deficient protection to the detriment of an individual could 
per se justify a deviation from the obligation to cooperate. By analogy, the Court fol-
lowed a similar approach in its case-law concerning the protection of the procedural 
public policy of the Member States in the domain of judicial cooperation in civil and 
commercial matters.113 Accordingly, AG Sharpston, in Radu, suggested that the gravity 
of the violation of the rights of the accused, such as the right to be heard and the right 
to an effective remedy, is the key-criterion in order to refuse surrender: “The infringe-
ment in question must be such as fundamentally to destroy the fairness of the pro-
cess”.114 
In conclusion, the systemic deficiencies referred to by the Court of Justice should be 
assessed on the basis of a “gravity test”, with the purpose of ascertaining whether (the 
risk of) a manifest and serious violation of a fundamental right justifies placing a limit to 
mutual recognition and mutual trust.115 
vi.3. Are certain rights more equal than others? The scope of application 
of the new ground for postponing/abandoning execution 
The second tier of the assessment concerning the exceptional situations threshold re-
gards a qualitative analysis of the rights whose violation could trigger the enforcement 
of the new ground for postponement/abandonment of execution.  
So far, both in N.S. and Aranyosi and Căldăraru, the Court was confronted with a seri-
ous risk of violation of the prohibition of torture and inhuman and degrading treatment, 
under Art. 4 of the Charter. The Court took into account also human dignity, the over-
arching paradigm of the EU legal order enshrined in Art. 1 of the Charter.116 Human dig-
 
112 Court of Justice, judgment of 30 July 1996, case C-84/95, Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret, 
para. 20. 
113 Court of Justice, judgment of 28 March 2000, case C-7/98, Krombach, para. 37; Court of Justice, 
judgment of 2 April 2009, case C-394/07, Gambazzi, para. 27: “Recourse to a public policy clause can be 
envisaged only where recognition or enforcement of the judgment delivered in another Contracting State 
would be at variance to an unacceptable degree with the legal order of the State in which enforcement is 
sought inasmuch as it infringes a fundamental principle. The infringement would have to constitute a 
manifest breach of a rule of law regarded as essential in the legal order of the State in which enforce-
ment is sought or of a right recognised as being fundamental within that legal order”. 
114 Opinion of AG Sharpston, Radu, cit., para. 95. 
115 In relation to the N.S. case, it has been contended that the systemic flaws threshold upheld by the 
Court of Justice finds an additional explanation in the Court’s intention to preserve the policy choices 
made by the EU legislator. From this point of view, slight or minor infringements of a fundamental right 
could not justify a deviation from EU secondary law which the EU legislature did not agree to. See I. 
CANOR, My brother’s keeper, cit., p. 404. The anchoring to the seriousness of the violation seems a good 
solution to preserve the functioning of the system from excessive judicial activism, while also respecting 
overarching duty to protect fundamental rights. 
116 Court of Justice, judgment of 14 October 2014, case C-36/02, Omega. 
On a Collision Course! Mutual Recognition, Mutual Trust and the Protection of Fundamental Rights 989 
nity, the right to life and the prohibition of torture and inhuman and degrading treat-
ments are considered absolute rights for the purposes of the EU legal order.117 As such, 
they more easily justify a restriction to the effective application of EU secondary law. 
However, this is not suggestive per se of a boundary delimiting the scope of application 
of the new block to mutual recognition and mutual trust within the narrow area of abso-
lute fundamental rights. The factual background of the cases required the EU secondary 
acts at stake to be interpreted in light of those specific provisions of the Charter. 
On the contrary, the execution of a foreign judicial decision calls into question sev-
eral non-absolute rights. While acknowledging that an internal hierarchy between fun-
damental rights rights is inherent to any complex legal order, AGs have on many occa-
sions suggested that even the non-absolute provisions of the Charter deserve protec-
tion in the event of a confirmed deficiency and of a real risk of violation.118 In N.S., AG 
Trstenjak made no distinctions and expressed the view that the transfer of asylum 
seekers to a Member State where their rights would be seriously endangered was in-
compatible with the Charter.119 The same AG confirmed and more comprehensively ex-
plained this approach in K.,120 after the Court had already delivered its judgment in N.S. 
In relation to judicial cooperation in criminal matters, AG Sharpston contended that 
the violation of Arts 6, 47 and 48 of the Charter could amount to limiting the execution 
of an EAW.121 More recently, AG Bot affirmed that the application of the ne bis in idem 
principle cannot lead to the recognition of a foreign decision manifestly contrary to 
fundamental rights.122 In particular, he found that the rights of the victim had been 
plainly infringed and therefore suggested the Court excluding the receiving authority’s 
obligation to recognise the foreign judgment.123  
For instance, fundamental rights concerns may be raised in the event an EAW was 
issued for the execution of a conviction based on statements from witnesses who could 
not be cross-examined, under the conditions set out by the Strasbourg Court in Al Kha-
waya and Tahery v. United Kingdom.124 The right to defence and the right to an effective 
 
117 Court of Justice, judgment of 12 June 2003, case C-112/00, Schmidberger. See also A. TANCREDI, 
L’emersione dei diritti fondamentali assoluti nella giurisprudenza comunitaria, in Rivista di diritto internaziona-
le, 2006, p. 644 et seq. 
118 The same view is expressed by M. BÖSE, Human rights violations and mutual trust: recent case law on 
the European Arrest Warrant, in S. RUGGERI (ed.), Human rights in European criminal law. New developments in 
European legislation and case law after the Lisbon Treaty, Berlin: Springer 2015, p. 139 et seq. 
119 Opinion of AG Trstenjak delivered on 22 September 2011, joined cases C-411/10 and C-493/10, 
N.S., para. 116. 
120 Opinion of AG Trstenjak delivered on 27 June 2012, case C-245/11, K., para. 65. 
121 Opinion of AG Sharpston, Radu, cit., paras 95 and 97. 
122 Opinion of AG Bot delivered on 15 December 2015, case C-486/14, Kossowski, paras 80-84. 
123 Ivi, para. 81: “It is manifest, in the main proceedings, that the rights of the victim have not been 
guaranteed, in particular the right to be heard, the right to information and the right to compensation”. 
124 European Court of Human Rights, judgment of 15 December 2011, nos 26766/05 and 22228/06, 
Al Khawaya and Tahery v. United Kingdom. 
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remedy may give rise to turmoil as well.125 Moreover, the CJEU’s findings potentially 
open the way to further general boundaries to cooperation mechanisms, such as, as 
discussed above, a proportionality check, in light of the principle of proportionality of 
offences and penalties under Art. 49 of the Charter. Accordingly, in parallel with judicial 
cooperation in civil matters, public policy could be invoked as an additional and flexible 
clause in order to allow the executing State to respect fundamental rights.126 
A restrictive reading of the Luxembourg case-law would therefore deprive the recon-
ciliation process developed by the Court of substance and the protection guaranteed by 
the Charter of its effectiveness. The focal point should then be, once again, the demon-
stration of the gravity of the violation of a right enshrined in the Charter, irrespectively of 
its absolute nature and in light of the consequences on the individuals concerned.127 
This approach is even more important because of the general implications of the 
case-law of the Court of Justice, that must be framed within the whole context of judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters. The EU acquis on the implementation of mutual recog-
nition covers a wide range of national judicial decisions, which likewise require a recon-
ciliation between full effectiveness of judicial cooperation and the protection of funda-
mental rights.128 
vi.4. Objective, reliable, specific and properly updated information: 
demonstrating the serious risk of a violation of a fundamental 
right 
The last constitutive element of the concept of exceptional situation calls into question 
a reliability test on available information concerning the Member State’s failure to re-
spect the EU level of protection of a fundamental right. 
 
125 See for instance Court of Justice, judgment of 4 June 2013, case C-300/11, ZZ, on the right to in-
formation concerning the grounds of a sentence, in the event the disclosure be contrary to the interests 
of State security. See also the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights mentioned therein. 
126 The parallel between judicial cooperation in criminal and civil matters from the perspective of the 
limits deriving from fundamental rights protection would deserve much more attention, but remains in 
the background of the present analysis. For an in-depth comment of the recent case-law on this topic see 
G. BIAGIONI, Avotinš v. Latvia. The uneasy balance between mutual recognition of judgments and protection of 
fundamental rights, in European Papers, 2016, www.europeanpapers.eu, p. 579 et seq. Krombach, cit., para. 
44; Court of Justice, judgment of 14 December 2006, case C-283/05, ASML Netherlands, paras 18-21. 
127 In any event, the wording of opinion 2/13 of the Court of Justice, cit., para. 191, and a comparison 
with the case-law on the balance between mutual recognition and fundamental rights in judicial coopera-
tion in civil matters leads to consider that only manifest and disproportionate breaches could amount to 
limiting the twofold duty to recognise and execute the foreign decision. See Court of Justice, judgment of 
6 September 2012, case C-619/10, Trade Agency, paras 40 and 43. 
128 Opinion of AG Bot, Aranyosi and Căldăraru, cit., para. 128. S. RUGGERI, Human rights in European 
criminal law, cit., parts from I to IV. 
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The problem of the quality and quantity of evidence allowed to support the afore-
mentioned executing authority’s double assessment concerning the existence of a defi-
ciency and of a real risk of violation is a major one.129 
As to the information on the existence of a deficiency, in Aranyosi and Căldăraru the 
Court of Justice refers “inter alia” to a set of qualified sources: “Judgments of interna-
tional courts, such as judgments of the ECtHR, judgments of courts of the issuing Mem-
ber State, and also decisions, reports and other documents produced by bodies of the 
Council of Europe or under the aegis of the UN”.130 
Therefore, even soft-law documents acquire evidentiary relevance, insofar as they 
come from qualified bodies or organizations. This wording has been read as an express 
preference for information by selected public authorities.131 However, relying only on 
these sources of information could prevent the executing authority from having access 
to useful contributions by NGOs and other private organizations. After all, a literal (and 
sound) interpretation of the wording of the judgment leads to consider that the list pro-
vided by the Court is far from exhaustive. Quite surprisingly, the Court did not make 
reference to the Fundamental Rights Agency of the European Union. Moreover, and 
more obviously, any act of the EU institutions and bodies could be an important basin 
of information concerning the situation of a national legal order. 
Rather than aiming at selecting the relevant sources, the Court of Justice merely 
stressed the importance of the substantive authority of the information collected, irre-
spectively of the nature of its origin. In fact, provided that the information at stake is 
“objective, reliable, specific and properly updated”,132 it is for the national courts to 
weight such information and decide, taking into due consideration the primary role of 
the principle of mutual trust.133 
The same approach should apply to the second and in concreto test as well. Even if 
the main reference point is the competent authority in the issuing Member State, that is 
under the obligation to provide information pursuant to Art. 15, para. 2, of Framework 
Decision 2002/584, the executing one has a certain degree of discretion. In fact, in order 
to perform the reconciliation process between mutual recognition and fundamental 
rights, provided that the aforementioned substantive preconditions concerning the 
 
129 See supra, section V.2. 
130 Aranyosi and Căldăraru, cit., para. 89. 
131 S. GÁSPÁR-SZILÁGY, Joined cases Aranyosi and Căldăraru. Converging human rights standards, mutual 
trust and new grounds for postponing a European Arrest Warrant, in European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law 
and Criminal Justice, 2016, p. 214.  
132 Aranyosi and Căldăraru, cit., paras 89, 94 and 104. 
133 Of course, in the absence of common rules, it is for the national courts to decide on the methods 
of assessment of evidence and on the weight to be attributed to each source of information. This aspect 
could increase fragmentation and lead to the risk of diverging national solutions or even wrong domestic 
judgments. This is why the Court of Justice set a high evidentiary threshold. Moreover, in the event of a 
doubt, national courts should refer to Luxembourg pursuant to Art. 267 TFEU. 
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quality of information are met, it is entitled to use “any other information that can be 
available”.134  
After all, the European Court of Human Rights usually admits reports by private en-
tities, in particular NGOs and other organizations committed to fundamental rights: it is 
not a matter of formal use, rather of substantive assessment.135 
In this regard, the need for a close dialogue between the national authorities is one 
of the judgment’s most important practical consequences, in view of the functioning of 
cooperation mechanisms and of the future development of a truly European judicial 
space. In fact, particular importance has to be attached to the information provided by 
the issuing State,136 in order to avoid any abuse of fundamental rights as a carte blanche 
in the hands of executing authorities.137 
From this point of view, the role of the requested persons is crucial as well, since 
during the procedure for the execution of an EAW they can be a decisive source of in-
formation on the level of protection of a certain right in the issuing State. The eviden-
tiary contribution of the requested persons will be even more important in the near fu-
ture. In fact, Art. 10 of the Directive 2013/48/EU on the right of access to a lawyer, 
whose deadline for transposition at national level will expire in November 2016,138 also 
provides the right to appoint a lawyer in the Member State where an EAW was issued, in 
order to ensure an effective exercise of the right to defence. 
VII. Strengthening fundamental rights protection in the EU: the 
structural implications of the post-collision order 
vii.1. Mutual recognition, mutual trust and the empowerment of 
national judicial authorities: a new paradigm? 
Trust implies commitment and ensures shared advantages in terms of closer relation-
ships and more ambitious achievements. In turn, it veils a persistent risk of disap-
 
134 Aranyosi and Căldăraru, cit., para. 98. 
135 L. HODSON, NGOs and the struggle for human rights in Europe, Oxford and Portland: Hart Publishing, 
2011. M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, cit., para. 160. 
136 AG Bot pointed out this concern with regard to the formal qualification of fundamental rights as 
grounds for refusal of executions. However, he underlined that a lack of effective cooperation between 
the authorities involved would in any event result in a systemic risk for the Area of freedom, security and 
justice: opinion of AG Bot, Aranyosi and Căldăraru, cit., paras 122-129 and 179.  
137 The questions arises in particular in case of an executing authority’s motu proprio initiative, where 
the presumption on the equivalent protection of fundamental rights would be severely endangered. S. 
GÁSPÁR-SZILÁGY, Joined cases Aranyosi and Căldăraru, cit., para. 215. 
138 Directive 2013/48/EU of the European Parliament and the Council of 22 October 2013 on the right 
of access to a lawyer in criminal proceedings and in European arrest warrant proceedings, and on the 
right to have a third party informed upon deprivation of liberty and to communicate with third persons 
and with consular authorities while deprived of liberty. 
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pointment. As such, it raises the question of who is to be trusted, and to what extent: 
“The history of trust is the history of the containment of distrust”.139 
Containment of distrust has traditionally represented a primary concern in the dis-
course of the European institutions, Court of Justice first in line. In order to facilitate 
mutual recognition and thereby ensure the functioning of judicial cooperation mecha-
nisms, the Court has repeatedly supported the assumption that Member States share a 
high level of mutual confidence. Conversely, any operational limit to the principle has 
been usually labelled as a threat to inter-State relations and a potential factor of defla-
gration of the process of European integration. The ensuing absolute reading of mutual 
trust has gradually devoid this notion of its conceptual complexity, in favour of a naive 
and optimistic presumption of blind trust among European peoples. 
The recent trend of the Luxembourg case-law paves the way to a new and more 
mature understanding of mutual trust and, necessarily, mutual recognition. By ac-
knowledging that the presumption concerning the level of protection of fundamental 
rights is rebuttable, the Court has replaced a theoretical dogma of trust with a decen-
tralised review over the protection of individual rights at national level. 
Trust is now coupled by a form of control, through which a Member State is entitled 
to verify whether its mates properly respect their obligation to protect the rights en-
shrined in the Charter. Such control, which has been described as a form of horizontal 
Solange test,140 strengthens the EU system of protection of fundamental rights, on the 
basis of common EU standards. Its contours, discussed in the previous paragraph, dis-
mantle the assumption that mutual controls equal to mutual distrust and increased 
suspicion. Instead, the prevalence of an effective and more complete fundamental 
rights protection system over the full implementation of EU policies becomes now an 
essential component for the establishment of a sincere mutual confidence.141 
This approach marks a twofold shift of paradigm. Firstly, it strengthens the Europe-
an Union’s role as a fundamental rights promoter, first and foremost within its borders. 
The EU accepts that its interest to effective law enforcement via mutual recognition can 
be set aside, albeit in exceptional circumstances. Secondly, it detaches EU policies, es-
pecially in highly sensitive fields for national sovereignty, from primarily focusing on the 
 
139 For a deeper analysis of the idea of mutual trust in legal matters see F.L. FILLAFER, Mutual trust in 
the history of ideas, in D. GERARD, E. BROUWER (eds), Mapping mutual trust: understanding and framing the role 
of mutual trust in EU law, in EUI Working Papers, MWP 2016/13, p. 3 et seq.  
140 I. CANOR, My brother’s keeper, cit., p. 401. 
141 National courts form an integral part of the EU system of judicial remedies: even though they are 
not mentioned in the Treaties, the Court of Justice has underlined their role under Art. 19 TEU: Court of 
Justice, opinion 1/09 of 8 March 2011, para. 66. 
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interests of the Member States, for instance in terms of increased extraterritorial exer-
cise of coercive powers.142 
vii.2. Mutual trust and the standard of protection of fundamental 
rights 
The problem of fundamental rights protection standards has been widely discussed in 
the last years, in particular with regard to the relationship between the EU, the national 
legal orders and the system of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
National case-law highlights a widespread trend towards the erosion of the almost 
absolute reading of the principle of mutual recognition proposed by the Court, in favour 
of fundamental rights concerns. For instance, Dutch courts have on many occasions re-
jected the execution of an EAW on the basis of fundamental rights or proportionality 
grounds.143 In the same vein, the Federal German Constitutional Court has recently af-
firmed that the protection of fundamental rights, namely, in that case, the principle of 
individual guilt, may include the denial of execution of an EAW, if it is indispensable in 
order to guard constitutional identity.144 Also, following the previously mentioned Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights judgment in Torreggiani v. Italy,145 two courts in the United 
Kingdom and Ireland had already refused the execution of an EAW issued by Italy, in 
order to prevent the requested persons from facing the risk of inhuman and degrading 
treatment caused by the deficiencies of the Italian prison system.146 A more in-depth 
 
142 Moreover, the findings of the Court have to be read in conjunction with the adoption of an in-
creasing number of EU secondary acts on the rights of the individual in criminal procedure. According to 
some scholars, this new season of legislation has a “transformative effect”, since it contributes to a fun-
damental rights oriented future evolution of judicial cooperation in criminal matters: V. MITSILEGAS, Mutual 
recognition, mutual trust and fundamental rights, cit., p. 164. 
143 See the cases reported by W. VAN BALLEGOOIJ, The European arrest warrant: between the free move-
ment of judicial decision, proportionality and the rule of law, in E. GUILD, L. MARIN (eds), Still not resolved?, cit., 
p. 77. 
144 The Court was confronted with a complaint raised by a US citizen, whose surrender had been 
urged by an Italian judicial authority; however, the Bundesvervassungsgericht found that the complainant 
had been sentenced to a thirty year custodial sentence without being heard and without proper notice. 
Then, in light of the provisions of the Basic Law on human dignity, criminal liability and constitutional 
identity, it considered that the situation required further investigations by the competent German re-
gional court. On one hand, the Court referred to the national notion and standard of protection of the 
principle of individual guilt; on the other, it considered that the Council Framework Decision on the EAW 
takes into account fundamental rights and that, as a consequence, a proper interpretation of EU law re-
quired surrendered to be refused.  
145 See supra, footnote 90. 
146 Judiciary of England and Wales, Judge Howard Riddle, judgment of 17 March 2014, Corte d’Appello 
di Palermo v. Domenico Rancadore; Irish Supreme Court, judgment of 12 October 2013, Minister for Justice 
and Equality v. Kelly aka Nolan. 
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analysis would certainly reveal remarkable and frequent deviations from Luxembourg 
orthodoxy on mutual recognition and mutual trust.  
Nonetheless, the functioning of judicial cooperation mechanisms would be radically 
hampered if any national court was entitled to make its own assessment on the subject 
and to depart from common standards and uniform application of EU law. In Melloni 
the Court addressed this risk and placed primacy, effectiveness and uniformity of EU 
law at the core of judicial cooperation in criminal matters, even to the detriment of 
higher national levels of protection of a fundamental right.  
Aranyosi and Căldăraru does not put that finding into question. In fact, the Court’s 
reasoning is focused on the respect of the EU standard of protection set by the Charter, 
which has in principle the same legal value as mutual recognition.147 It follows that 
Aranyosi and Căldăraru runs in parallel with Melloni and that the new ground for post-
ponement/abandonment applies only in case the European level of protection is at 
stake. Accordingly, the horizontal Solange test the national judicial authorities are enti-
tled to make must rely on the common EU standard, in order to avoid fragmentation 
and to preserve the primacy and uniformity of EU law.  
At the same time, the revised balance between fundamental rights and mutual 
recognition confirms the key-role of the case-law of the European Court of Human 
Rights for the EU system of protection of fundamental rights. Despite the tensions en-
visaged following the opinion 2/13,148 the acquis of the European Court of Human 
Rights is essential for identifying both the standard of protection of a right and the real 
risk of its violation.149 From this point of view, the activity of the European Court of Hu-
man Rights will be a crucial reference point for the protection par ricochet of those 
rights that are put under pressure in the context of an EAW procedure, given that many 
of them per se fall under the competences of the Member States. 
The revised paradigm equips the Court of Justice and Member States with more ef-
fective tools to face the recurring key-challenge of the EU integration process: “One of 
 
147 For an in-depth analysis, L.S. ROSSI, Lo stesso valore giuridico dei Trattati? Rango, primato ed effetti 
diretti della Carta dei diritti fondamentali dell’Unione europea, in Il diritto dell’Unione europea, 2016, p. 329 et 
seq. It has been suggested that the Charter should be endowed with higher constitutional value than or-
dinary provisions of the Treaties, since it enshrines the founding values of the EU legal order: A. TIZZANO, 
L’application de la Charte des droits fondamentaux dans les Etats membres à la lumière de son article 51, par-
agraphe 1, in Il diritto dell’Unione europea, 2014, p. 429 et seq.  
148 N. LAZZERINI, Gli obblighi in materia di protezione dei diritti fondamentali come limite all’esecuzione del 
mandato di arresto europeo: la sentenza Aranyosi e Căldăraru, in Diritti umani e diritto internazionale, 2016, 
p. 490 et seq. 
149 From this point of view, Aranyosi and Căldăraru also aligns the double assessment of the systemic 
deficiency and of the individual real risk of a violation with the standard provided by the European Court 
of Human Rights. European Court of Human Rights, judgment of 7 July 1989, no. 14039/88, Soering v. 
United Kingdom, paras 90-91; European Court of Human Rights, judgment of 21 January 2011, no. 
30696/09, M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, para. 365.  
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the greatest achievements of the past decades has been to shift European integration 
from something that Europe does to something that Europe is”.150 
 
150 J.H.H. WEILER, Editorial. Integration through fear, in European Journal of International Law, 2012, p. 1. 
